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Ihave studied the facts of the bombing errorswhich occurred on the 14th August 1944 in
connection with Operation “TRACTABLE” during
which some of a large force of Bomber Command
dropped bombs in error on our own troops. I
have the following comments to make.
Previous operations of this type had been
outstanding successes. The Army has paid
generous tribute to their effect on the enemy in
enabling our own troops to advance, in addition
to saving our troops the much greater casualties
that would inevitably have occurred without this
type of support. The support attack in which
this accident occurred was otherwise an
outstanding success. Photographs subsequently
obtained show that each of the aiming points
was subjected to a very accurate and heavy
concentration of bombing which undoubtedly
had the effect sought in enabling the First
Canadian Army to advance with comparatively
light losses against enemy positions which had
previously proved intractable.
In order to obtain a full and clear picture of
the circumstances leading up to and occasioning
this accident it is necessary to stress certain
points both in regard to the actual occurrence
Report on the Bombing of Our
Own Troops during Operation
“Tractable” – 14 August 1944
Arthur T. Harris
Air Chief Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command
Editor’s note: Operation “Tractable” was the second major Canadian operation in Normandy
designed to break through the German defensive perimeter to reach Falaise. Like its predecessor,
Operation “Totalize,” “Tractable” was to employ heavy bombers to augment the firepower available
to the troops. The use of heavy bombers in a tactical role was a relatively new tasking for the
strategic force and required precise targetting to destroy and disrupt the enemy positions.  The
strategic bomber force, British and American, had made significant contributions to the land
battle in Normandy, but there had been mistakes, most notably during Operation “Cobra” when
the American 8th Air Force had twice bombed their own troops on 24-25 July causing 136 deaths
and an additional 621 casualties. For Operation “Tractable,” the medium bombers of 2 Group,
2nd Tactical Air Force were to bomb German gun, mortar and tank positions along the startline
immediately prior to H-Hour. This was to be followed by a large attack by Bomber Command
against German positions on the right flank of the Canadian attack, timed to commence two
hours after the start of the advance. This bombing was intended “to destroy or neutralize enemy
guns, harbours, and defended localities on the right flank and to prevent any enemy movement
from this area to the area of the attack.” (First Canadian Army Op Instruction No.14, August
1944). Though the air support was largely a success, a number of aircraft mistakenly bombed
short hitting units of First Canadian Army. In total, over 150 Allied soldiers were killed and 241
wounded by the short bombing. Though it had little impact on the outcome of “Tractable,” there
were a number of investigations launched to understand why the short bombing occurred. The
report which follows, dated 25 August 1944 and written by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris, Air
Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Bomber Command, contains the official RAF post-mortem on the
reasons for the accidental bombing of First Canadian Army.
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itself and in regard to this type of operation as a
whole.
The heavy bomber force is trained primarily
to operate in darkness. It is not trained to fly in
formation. In darkness the aircraft operate
individually according to an overall plan,
navigating by prescribed routes to the
neighbourhood of their objective and bombing,
under conditions in which no details of the
ground can generally be seen, on pyrotechnic
markers of varying types suited to the particular
occasion and placed on or near the objective by
pathfinder aircraft. Subsequent corrections are
made on the instructions of Master Bombers.
The entire force is trained to these methods
and to these only. This training and the
organisation which produces it cannot be
changed at a moment’s notice, or indeed at many
months’ notice, to enable the force to operate
with 100% efficiency in so entirely different a
role as close direct support to troops on the
ground in daylight.
With these facts in view, when urgent
demands began to arrive from the Army for
assistance by the heavy bomber force, it was
invariably pointed out that we would do our best
within the limits of our experience and training
to meet their requirements but that grave risk
The photographs on this page and the next were taken during the heavy bombing in support of the army during Operation
“Charnwood,” 7 July 1944. This photo gives a good idea of the number of aircraft that would be in the air over the target
during the attack (467 aircraft for “Charnwood; 811 aircraft for “Tractable”).
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inevitably existed in these circumstances of some
bombing going astray and taking effect upon our
own troops. Nevertheless previous operations on
which this type of bombing had been employed
at short notice had been so successful that the
Army authorities concerned expressed ready
acceptance of the risk in exchange for the proved
decisive effects of such bombing in forwarding
their military plans. They therefore entered this
venture, as did Bomber Command, in full
knowledge of the risks occasioned to our own
troops.
To enable those outside Bomber Command
to get a balanced view it is necessary to enlarge
somewhat on the crew training and organisation
in Bomber Command. As stated above this
training is for work entirely different from this
type of close support bombing. There is no
possibility of changing or expanding that training
within a reasonable period, even if it is necessary,
in order to provide this type of close support to
the troops on the ground.
The pilot in a heavy bomber has a very
limited view of the ground. Such as he has, he is
unable to take advantage of in an operation of
this description because the whole of his time
and attention is taken up in listening to his
navigator’s and air bomber’s corrections while
controlling his aircraft, keeping on the correct
course, and avoiding collisions in the high
A Halifax of Bomber Command attacks the northern suburbs of Caen during Operation “Charnwood,” 7 July 1944. The
amount of smoke and dust which obscured the target area once the bombing commenced is readily apparent.
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Incidents such as those which occurred on
this occasion must therefore be regarded in the
light of the above explanation of the abilities,
training and functions of the various members
of the crew together with the limitations imposed
upon the Captain and the navigator by the
structure of the aircraft, by the conditions in
which they work, and by their inability to know
what is actually going on underneath them or
precisely what the bomb aimer is seeing or doing.
The whole of the above must be further
considered in relation to the limitations of
experience of the crews. The casualty rate among
heavy bomber crews is exceedingly high. Their
tours are therefore short. Once their training is
completed and they commence to operate they
do not stay very long, even if they survive on
operations. The amount of actual experience
accumulated by any individual crew is therefore
necessarily very limited. The majority of the force
is consequently, at any given moment, largely
composed of new crews.
The circumstances of war being what they
are operations such as the one under discussion
are inevitably laid on ad hoc at the shortest
possible notice, never allowing adequate time for
any practice or even for extended discussion and
instruction.
On this occasion details of the operation were
brought over to this Headquarters late on the
concentration of aircraft which the methods of
bombing and considerations of enemy
opposition make essential.
The navigator also has virtually no view of
the ground. He is a machine-minder and plotter
who spends most of his time in a cabin utilising
the data provided by the various mechanical aids
to navigation, in conjunction with dead
reckoning, to determine the position of the
aircraft from minute to minute and to decide
any alteration of course and speed which may
be necessary to take the aircraft through to the
neighbourhood of the objective on the correct
route and bearing at the correct time.
The air bomber alone can undertake
direction of the aircraft by means of map reading
with reference to the ground beneath. His
training in this difficult art is extremely limited,
partly because there is not sufficient time during
his training to devote much effort to this
particular type of exercise, but mainly because,
the metier of the force being night bombing,
locating position by map reading from objects
on the ground is normally quite impossible.
Furthermore air bombers as a whole are by
no means of outstanding intelligence. They are
in the main selected as such because, although
passing other standards for aircrew, they are the
least likely to make efficient pilots or navigators.
The details of the planned bombing during Operation “Tractable” are as follows.  A total of 811 aircraft were
despatched against seven enemy concentrations, all within 2000 yards of the Canadians striking towards
Falaise:–
Quesnay (AP [Aiming Point] 21“A”) – 118 aircraft attacked with 552.8 tons HE and 8.1 tons IB.
Quesnay (AP 21“B”) – 102 aircraft attacked with 552.4 tons HE and 6.3 tons IB.
Bons Tassilly (AP 23) – 108 aircraft attacked with 427.7 tons HE and 6.3 tons IB.
Saumont St. Quentin (AP 22) – 110 aircraft attacked with 391.3 tons HE and 6.7 tons IB.
Aisy/Potigny (AP 28) – 127 aircraft attacked with 588.8 tons HE and 7.6 tons IB.
Fontaine le Pin (AP 25) – 112 aircraft attacked with 554.2 tons HE and 7.2 tons IB.
Potigny/Aisy/Ussy Road Junction (AP 24) – 105 aircraft attacked with 560.0 tons HE and 6.7 tons IB.
Total Bomb Tonnage – 3,627.2 tons HE and 48.9 tons IB.
25 sorties out of the 811 were abortive.
3 aircraft were lost.                                   [HE = high explosive; IB = incendiary bomb]
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evening of the 13th. On studying the proposals
it became at once clear to me that the necessity
to bomb the targets in succession from north to
south in order to meet time table essentials
postulated by the Army was inviting a dangerous
situation if the wind, as predicted (and as it
turned out to be) was northerly. It was obvious
that in that situation unless the wind
strengthened considerably more than could be
expected there would be a tendency for smoke
from the initial targets to obscure the remainder
and for smoke and smoke screens from enemy
shelling and from our own troops prior to the
bombing to obscure the entire area. That in fact
occurred to a considerable degree. But this risk
was accepted at the particular insistence of the
Army and in my view the acceptance of this risk
was reasonable in the battle conditions prevailing
and in view of the results required and known
by previous experience to be obtainable from this
type of bombing.
In the light of all the limitations mentioned
above it was at once apparent that the risk of
bombing our own troops existed in a serious
degree. It was carefully considered whether by
routeing the aircraft over the enemy lines entirely
the risk would in any way be lessened. This
would however have meant subjecting our
aircraft to enemy anti-aircraft opposition
throughout their flight over the continent in a
very heavily defended area. I was not prepared
to subject my crews to this additional risk in
order solely to lessen the risk of bombing our
own troops. Their casualty rate is and always
has been far in advance of anything suffered
anywhere by our ground troops. Furthermore
such an approach over enemy territory would
still not have entirely eliminated the risk because
the bombing was to take place within an enemy
salient extending deep into our lines. Whereas
the best check against bombing our troops was
a carefully timed run from the coast line to the
target area at a known speed this type of check
would have been further complicated if the run
in instead of being straight from the coast over
our own troops had been brought in over enemy
territory at an angle with a dog leg into the
salient. Furthermore there was as much risk that
aircraft might err to either side of their course
when coming into the salient from the east and
thereby stray over our own troops as there was
that by coming in straight over our own troops
they might drop short or even cross the salient
altogether and hit our troops on the far side. I
therefore decided on the straight run in over our
own troops.
On a previous occasion, which in the
outcome produced a highly satisfactory series
of attacks, I had been asked at a few hours notice
to stage close support bombing of our troops in
the dark. Knowing the limitations of the force I
was originally horrified at this proposal. But a
solution having to be found or the entire army
plan wrecked at the last moment, the problem
was solved by having our own artillery fire
coloured marker shells on to the aiming points.
These points were then re-marked in a clearer
manner understandable to our air bombers by
the pathfinder aircraft with their special
pyrotechnics. I considered whether this would
be possible on this occasion. But as this attack
was to be brought off in daylight I was advised
that the coloured artillery shells would be
unlikely to show up. There was no time to test
this out. It was doubtful whether stocks of
coloured shells were available and there was no
time to find out. I therefore had to discard a
possible safeguard which, however, held within
it serious possibilities of even further confusing
the issue.
The mistakes made on this occasion
(although as I have remarked, apart from these
mistakes the operation was otherwise an
outstanding success) were as follows:-
Phase 1 – From 1441 to 1459 hours one
Pathfinder, 4 crews of No.4 Group and 9 crews
of No.6 (RCAF) Group bombed mistakenly near
St. Aignan within our own lines. The pathfinder
was a “non-marker” aircraft and it has been
clearly established that no markers fell in that
vicinity.
I can see no valid excuse for these bombing
errors; not even for the errors of aircraft which
followed on behind those initiating the mistake.
Attention by the navigators and Captains
concerned to the timing of their run from the
point where they crossed the coast inland would
have at once shown them that they were bombing
short by many seconds.
Phase 2 – From 1514 to 1518 hours, 12
additional aircraft of No. 6 (RCAF) Group and 1
Pathfinder aircraft bombed in error in the same
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area of St. Aignan. The bombing
this time was started by a backing
up aircraft of the Pathfinder
Group carrying ground target
indicators. The air bomber of this
aircraft saw what he thought were
yellow target indicators already
burning on the ground and
considerable smoke from the
previous bombing. He also picked
up the Master Bomber ’s
instructions to bomb the yellow
target indicators. The Master
Bomber was at that time of
course, watching and discussing
the indicators on the correct
target which was simultaneously
being bombed.
Here again attention to the
timed run from the point of
crossing the coast line would have
made this error impossible by
any of the aircraft concerned.
Phase 3 – From 1514 to 1520
hours 23 aircraft of No.6 (RCAF)
Group, bombed the quarry at
Haut Mesnil in error. This was
started by two aircraft of No.428
(RCAF) Squadron who bombed
almost simultaneously. They had
been briefed to expect to see
smoke arising from aiming point
21 which should have been
bombed by another force before
their arrival. They appear to have
mistaken the smoke rising from
the erroneous bombing near St.
Aignan for the smoke from aiming
point 21. The Master Bomber
concerned, who was operating on
and viewing the correct target,
instructed arriving aircraft to
“bomb yellow target indicators.
You will find them when you have passed the
first column of smoke.” This appeared to fit the
picture as these aircraft saw it and they also
claimed to have seen yellow target indicators
burning in the neighbourhood of their supposed
target.
Here again proper attention to a lapsed time
run from the point of crossing the coast line
would have made, this mistake impossible.
Phase 4 – The quarry at Haut Mesnil was again
bombed from 1532 hours onwards. This was
started by aircraft “J” of 460 (RAAF) Squadron.
The air bomber of this aircraft claims that he
saw through the smoke of previous bombing
what he thought were red target indicators
burning on the ground “which he had previously
seen cascading.” At the same time, another
aircraft of the same squadron also bombed what
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he claimed to have been yellow markers. This
target was bombed by a total of 26 aircraft of
No.1 Group.
Here again attention to the lapsed time since
crossing the coast line would have prevented this
error.
The analysis of aircraft in error is as follows:
In the meantime all aiming points were
otherwise being very accurately and heavily
attacked by the great majority of the force.
I have referred above to claims by many
crews that they were misled by what looked like
coloured target indicators on the ground and in
the air.
As I have remarked, I consider that in spite
of these misleading factors (which are explained
hereafter) these errors were inexcusable had the
Captains seen to it that their navigators and
bomb aimers paid proper attention to the timed
run from the coast line. This timed run they too
lightheartedly abandoned, some because they
thought they saw target indicators – sooner than
they could have been expected on a timed run –
others because they merely followed sheeplike
the errors of their predecessors.
On hearing of these apparently misplaced
target indicators and after investigation realising
that they could not have been from our own
pathfinder aircraft, I sent an officer over to
France to investigate. He reports as follows:–
On August 20th, 1944, I reported to
Headquarters No. 84 Group which Headquarters
is alongside that of the 1st Canadian Army. I saw
S.A.S.O. and Group Captain Ops. and explained
to them the sequence of events as they had so
far transpired, which led up to the incorrect
bombing on August 14th. In particular I raised
the matter of the alleged yellow lights which had
been seen on the ground both in the St. Aignan
and Quarry areas. I was immediately told that
yellow smoke, flares and celanese strips were
the standard signals for troops of all allied
armies in France to indicate their positions to
our own aircraft. I was shown a copy of 1st
Canadian Army Operations Standing Orders
from which the following is an extract.
“SECTION 8 GROUND/AIR CONVENTIONS
Para. 8. – Recognition signals displayed by
forward troops will be either or both of the
following:
(a) Yellow and/or orange smoke and/or yellow
flares
(b) Yellow celanese triangles sewn together in
strips of 10".
Para 10. – Forward troops will display
recognition signals as in para. 8 above if attacked
by friendly aircraft.”
I pointed out that crews claimed to have seen
yellow lights looking like target markers before
any bombs fell in the areas occupied by our own
troops, and asked, therefore, whether these
yellow flares and smoke would only be fired by
troops after they had actually been attacked by
friendly aircraft. I was informed that owing to
there having been numerous minor incidents
involving the attack of friendly troops by our own
tactical aircraft, it was quite common for these
signals to be displayed if the troops imagined
they were going to be attacked. I was also told
by Officers, both Army and Air Force, who were
amongst the troops bombed on that occasion,
that the fact that the aircraft were seen
approaching with their bomb doors open, made
them feel nervous that they were going to be
bombed. I could get no direct evidence that
yellow flares were alight on the ground prior to
the first bomb falling behind our own lines, but
it would appear most probable that they were.
The manner in which these yellow flares, smoke
and strips are laid in such circumstances is in
the form of a cluster, and thus they resemble
the pattern of target indicators on the ground.
No information had been given to this
Command to the effect that this system of
marking was in use and in fact my Senior Air
Staff Officer, who had in the very short time
available hurriedly arranged this operation with
the First Canadian Army in France the previous
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Before and after photographs of
Quesnay and Quesnay Wood. The
top photo was taken on 26 July 1944
while the bottom photo was taken
shortly after the attack of 14 August
1944.
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day, had particularly sought information on the
subject of possibly confusing pyrotechnics and
been assured that none would be used. To that
extent therefore, the First Canadian Army
themselves subscribed to the errors which were
made. Furthermore, AEAF [Allied Expeditionary
Air Force] and/or 1st Canadian Army should have
informed this Command of the common use of
these pyrotechnics.
A sensational story was subsequently
permitted to appear in the press, from war
correspondents presumably controlled by the
Army and Air Authorities in France, to the effect
that wholesale disaster was only averted by the
intervention of some Army-controlled Auster
aircraft which fired red Verey lights over an area
or areas where bombing was being carried out
in error and thus prevented the entire bomber
force from committing the same mistake. My
comment on this is that in the first place the
rest of the bombing was under way, firmly
controlled by the Master Bombers and achieving
excellent results on the correct aiming points.
In the second place red Verey lights fired into
smoke or seen through smoke burning on the
ground are likely to and did in fact, give a
misleading imitation of target indicators.
However well intentioned, therefore, these Auster
aircraft succeeded only in making confusion
worse confounded. As to how the sensational
account of their intervention, including the
names of the Auster pilots, was allowed to get
into the press is a matter which the Air and Army
authorities concerned will no doubt investigate.
I will only comment thereon to the effect that of
the thousands of Royal Air Force aircraft which
have been fired on by our own defences and by
our troops, and in a very large number of cases
brought down and destroyed, I do not recall one
instance of the RAF authorities permitting such
facts to be known outside the Service circles
necessarily concerned in investigating such
incidents for the purpose of preventing, if
possible, a recurrence. I regard the emanation
of these sensational and untrue accounts through
officially controlled channels as deplorable. As
the names of the Auster pilots concerned were
also made public the responsibility is not only
that of correspondents and censors.
Petrol dumps and ammunition set ablaze by short bombing in the 4th Canadian
Armoured Division sector near St. Aignan-de-Cramesnil, 14 August 1944.
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To sum up – These errors were caused by:
The emergency ad hoc use at short notice,
of the heavy bomber force on a type of task for
which it is not trained, in full knowledge of the
risks involved, as of the gains to be secured. In
my opinion this has been completely justified
by the decisive successes achieved.
The inherent limitations of the structure of
the aircraft whereby the bomb aimer, unused to
and not well trained or suited to the task, is the
only individual in the crew with an uninterrupted
and adequate view of the ground for pilotage by
map reading when nearing the target.
The use of coloured pyrotechnics on the
ground by the troops without this Command
being informed and indeed after this Command’s
representative had been assured that nothing of
the sort would be used. These pyrotechnics
fortuitously imitated yellow target marker flares.
The use of Red Verey lights by Auster aircraft
in a mistaken effort to stop bombing already
initiated on incorrect targets. These red lights
seen cascading and burning on the ground
through smoke emulated red target markers and
in some cases confirmed the bomber crews’ view
that they were on the correct target.
The necessity, postulated by the Army
Authorities concerned, of bombing the targets
in the reverse order to that made desirable by
the wind direction.
The light wind which caused battle smoke
and bomb smoke to hang about the whole area
and obscure detail.
The over ready relinquishment of the timed
run check from the coastline by the Captains
and Navigators implicated. Although this type
of operation and navigational check in daylight
is not normally used by crews on the tasks for
which they are trained and to which they are
accustomed, there is no-excuse for their laxity
in that connection on this occasion.
A sheep-like following on of some crews
misled by those preceding them.
Finally, I would add that no blame attaches
to the Master Bombers. They carried out a most
difficult and delicate task at short notice with
the greatest efficiency and success, in which they
were supported by the great majority of the
Bomber Force.
I am satisfied that the crews were properly
briefed and indeed, in the case of No. 6 (RCAF)
Group, who were the most in error, that the Air
Officer Commanding No.6 (RCAF) Group [Air
Vice-Marshal C.M. McEwen] went out of his way
by special briefing and the provision of stop
watches etc. to ensure that the time check was
properly emphasised.
But as I have said, I regard the errors of the
few who erred as being in this particular case
inexcusable solely on the grounds that no matter
what misleading conditions and indications
existed any adequate effort to maintain the check
on a timed run from the coast line to the target
area could and would have prevented those
errors.
In any future close support operations of this
description I regard the following as essential
safeguards. The necessary instructions are being
issued accordingly:–
1. Wind direction and smoke drift must be
the over-riding consideration in the planning of
all close support operations, as this Command
has always maintained. It must be given priority
over military or other tactical requirements
unless the Army adamantly insist otherwise and
appreciate that the risk of bombing our own
troops, although fully known to them, is
acceptable; as indeed it was stated to be in this
case in view of the military advantages sought.
2. Timed run procedure is to be adhered
to by all crews and the Captain is to be
responsible for this procedure being strictly
applied.
3. A master switch is to be installed
forthwith on the navigator’s panel with which he
can prevent bombs being released by the bomb
aimer before the expiry of the timed run, the
timing of which is the responsibility of the
navigator. This, inter alia, should preclude any
repetition of bombing short by mistakenly
applying the Master Bomber’s broadcast
instruction on the real target to any other area
where conditions as in this case are fortuitously
simulated.
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4. On all such close support operations,
Captains, air bombers and navigators must carry
large scale maps or photographs to enable them,
if the conditions of smoke and visibility permit,
to make a final personal check as to the
correctness of the aiming point.
5. To safeguard against faulty release of
bombs when the bomb doors are opened (which
happens occasionally for technical reasons and
which would be likely to mislead other crews
who see such bombs burst beneath them) bomb
doors are to be opened either prior to crossing
the coast or at least 20 miles from the release
point over open areas.
6. The troops concerned must be given
orders to use no pyrotechnics likely to be
confused as target markers and an
acknowledgment that this has been done sent
to Bomber Command prior to the operation.
7. Extra Master Bombers with “cancellation
pyrotechnics” must shepherd the route wherever
it lies over our own troops – as soon as suitable
pyrotechnics can be devised.
[signed]
Arthur T. Harris
Air Chief Marshal
Commanding-in-Chief
Bomber Command
25 August 1944
Distribution:
Deputy Supreme Commander, AEF
Air C-in-C AEAF
AMC, 2nd Tactical Air Force
Air Ministry (VCAS)
AOC-in-C RCAF Overseas
GOC-in-C 1st Canadian Army
AOsC 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 100 Groups
From: Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command
To: Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force
Air Marshal Commanding, 2nd Tactical Air Force
Information copies to: Air Ministry Vice Chief of the Air Staff
AOC-in-C RCAF HQ Overseas
GOC-in-C 1st Canadian Army
With regards to the attached report. After consultation with the Air Officers Commanding concerned
I have taken the following action.
2.  The two Pathfinder Force crews have relinquished their Pathfinder badges and the acting ranks
consequent upon Pathfinder employ. They have been reposted to ordinary crew duties.
3.  Squadron and Flight Commanders personally implicated have relinquished their Commands
and subsequent acting rank. They have been reposted for ordinary crew duty.
4. All crews implicated have been “starred” as not to be employed within thirty miles forward of the
bomb line until reassessed by the AOsC after further experience on targets outside the operational
area of our own troops.
5.  I would ask that suitable action be taken with regard to the failure to warn this Command of the
yellow flares commonly in use to mark our own troops; with regard to the mistaken action of the
Auster pilots; and with regard to the deplorable and largely untrue Press stories permitted to emanate
through RAF and Army controlled sources in France.
[signed]
Arthur T. Harris
Air Chief Marshal
Commanding-in-Chief
Bomber Command
25 August 1944
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